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Abstract 
This study aims to analyse the relationship between safety climate and the level of risk 
acceptance, as well as its relationship with workplace safety performance. The sample 
includes 14 companies and 403 workers. The safety climate assessment was performed 
by the application of a Safety Climate in Wood Industries questionnaire and safety 
performance was assessed with a checklist. Judgements about risk acceptance were 
measured through questionnaires together with four other variables: trust, risk perception, 
benefit perception and emotion. Safety climate was found to be correlated with 
workgroup safety performance, and it also plays an important role in workers’ risk 
acceptance levels. Risk acceptance tends to be lower when safety climate scores of 
workgroups are high, and subsequently, their safety performance is better. These findings 
seem to be relevant, as they provide Occupational, Safety and Health practitioners with a 
better understanding of workers’ risk acceptance levels and of the differences among 
workgroups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cultural context has been found to be an important factor in risk judgements because it 
determines the level of risk considered acceptable or unacceptable by a given group at a given 
time (Kouabenan 1998, 2009; Tingley et al. 2010). Despite this conception has been mentioned 
for the influence of the external social context, a similar outcome may also exist for occupational 
risks due to the influence of the internal cultural context. Such an analysis is important because 
it allows for a better understanding of how workers form their opinions on a given risk and why 
they adopt a certain attitude or behaviour towards risk. However, there are few studies on the 
influence of internal cultural context on risk acceptance. 
Safety climate is an important concept in an occupational risk management and a product/sub-
component (Choudhry, Fang, and Mohamed 2007) or an indicator of safety culture (Flin et al. 
2000; Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo 2008; Høivik et al. 2009). Zohar emphasised safety climate 
in the 1980s (Zohar 1980), and it has been defined as a descriptive measure that ‘can be 
regarded as the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce's attitudes 
and perceptions at a given point in time’ (Flin et al. 2000, 178). Therefore, safety climate can be 
an important indicator of several traits that influence safety (Antonsen 2009), particularly 
employees’ attitudes, perceptions and behaviours regarding health and safety (Choudhry, Fang, 
and Mohamed 2007; Antonsen 2009). 
By analysing the concept of safety climate and taking into account the dimensions that are 
frequently included in measurement instruments (see, Flin et al. 2000; Guldenmund 2000), it is 
possible to understand the importance of safety climate for safety management. In fact, in an 
occupational environment with a positive safety climate, several features are present: an 
organisational commitment to safety and the implementation of a safety policy where safety 
responsibilities and goals are clear and in accordance with the company's safety needs; safety 
systems that are established to promote safety and maintain low levels of risk; an environment 
where safety problems are quickly addressed; managers whose attitudes and behaviours 
demonstrate that safety is a priority; an environment that promotes safety training; an 
environment where the communicational channels are open, i.e., important information flows 
from management to the workforce and vice versa; workers who are motivated and follow the 
rules/procedures; and workspaces and workloads that are adequate for job efficiency. 
Therefore, it is plausible that companies with higher safety climate scores have higher safety 
performances and, hence, lower risk acceptance levels. 
Despite the background provided above, few studies have analysed the role of safety climate in 
risk acceptance. However, a growing body of research has emerged in last years, involving 
different sectors of activity, which has analysed the relationship of safety climate with safety 
outcomes, such as risk perception (RP) (Rundmo 2000; Huang et al. 2007; Tharaldsen, Olsen, 
and Rundmo 2008), safety management systems (Zohar 1980; Varonen and Mattila 2000), 
accident rates (Varonen and Mattila 2000; Johnson 2007; Arocena, Núñez, and Villanueva 2008; 
Nielsen et al. 2008; Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo 2008; Vinodkumar and Bhasi 2009Hon, 
Chan, and Yam 2014) and safety behaviours (Rundmo 2000; Johnson 2007; Lu and Yang 2011; 
Fugas, Silva, and Meliá 2012; Tholén, Pousette, and Törner 2013). Consequently, individuals who 
work in companies with a positive safety climate tend to perceive safety management systems 
as more efficient. Such workers are also more likely to comply with safety procedures and rules 
and consequently display fewer unsafe behaviours and are less likely to be involved in an 
accident. It is expected that these workers also present lower risk acceptance levels, particularly 
when considering that the workers’ level of risk acceptance can predict unsafe behaviours. 
The effect of safety climate on risk acceptance can also be indirect, i.e., by influencing other 
factors that can have an effect on risk acceptance. Previous studies in different areas have 
identified other important factors that can have a direct or indirect influence on risk acceptance 
levels, such as RP, benefit perception, trust and emotions (see, e.g., Siegrist 1999, 2000; Siegrist, 
Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000; Siegrist, Gutscher, and Earle 2005; Roeser 2006; Bronfman et al. 
2008; Bronfman, Vázquez, and Dorantes 2009; Ji et al. 2011; Bronfman et al. 2012; Huang et al. 
2013). These factors can also be influenced by the safety climate, which highlights the 
importance of the internal context on risk acceptance. This influence has been noted before for 
some of the factors in occupational settings, but particularly for RPs, as previously noticed. 
Similarly, it must be noted that internal cultural context can also influence risk acceptance on a 
group level because some differences in safety climate may arise among different groups, which 
indicates the presence of multi-subclimates (Clarke 2006; Guldenmund 2007; Zohar 2008; 
Brondino, Pasini, and Silva 2013; Rollenhagen, Westerlundb and Näswallc 2013) due to 
differences in workplace safety performance (Varonen and Mattila 2000; Cooper and Phillips 
2004; Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão in press) and management policies and to 
leadership/supervisors actions and co-workers’ influences (Clarke 2006; Brondino, Silva, and 
Pasini 2012; Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão in press). According to such assumptions, it seems that 
the influence of the safety climate on risk acceptance needs to be analysed at the group level. 
In light of the discussion above, gaining a better understanding of the influence of internal 
cultural contexts on risk acceptance is highly relevant. Such information may provide significant 
insights to organisations seeking to anticipate and understand responses to hazards, such as 
safety behaviours, to improve their strategies to reduce risks and gain information about risk 
(Slovic 1987; Huijts, Molina, and Steg 2012). For this reason, this study aims to analyse the 
influence of safety climate on the level of risk acceptance by workers as well as the relationship 
of safety climate with workgroup safety performance. This study was carried out in the 
Portuguese furniture sector, as it is one of the most important economic sectors of activity in 
Portugal's Northern region and a place where the number of occupational accidents still remains 
high (Eurostat 2012). 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Sample 
A total of 14 Portuguese furniture companies participated in the study and the data collection 
involved 403 participants from 33 workgroups that were identified according to the 
department/sector of activity, by supervision and by physical boundaries. The companies were 
selected according to their size and geographical location and were located in the Northern 
Region of Portugal, mostly in the area of Paços de Ferreira because the furniture industry is the 
most relevant sector in that region. 
Most of the participants were males (86.6%) and their mean age was 39.49 years (SD = 10.09). 
Workers had been employed by their current companies for an average of 10.47 years (SD = 
7.27) and had been engaged in manual labour for an average of 17.49 years (SD = 12.06). 
2.2. Safety climate analysis 
Analysis of the safety climate was performed using the Safety Climate in Wood Industries (SCWI) 
tool. This tool was previously developed and validated by the authors of this paper in a previous 
study (Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão in press). The SCWI is a specific tool to measure the safety 
climate in the furniture sector that takes into account the hierarchical structure of organisations, 
which allows for the identification of different safety climates between groups. 
The SCWI includes two main parts. The first part consists of questions related to the workers’ 
demographics, such as age, gender, department/sector, professional activity, the duration of 
current employment, the number of years engaged in manual labour and previous involvement 
in work accidents. The second part consists of 34 items that measure the safety climate at three 
levels: organisational, group and individual. The organisational level was measured with 13 
items related to the management's investment in safety issues, the continuous improvement of 
safety systems and safety communication. The group level was measured with 12 items. At this 
level, workers were asked about supervisory concerns related to workers’ safety practices, their 
involvement in safety issues and their efforts in regards to rule compliance and safety protection 
use. Finally, at the individual level, nine items measured workers’ commitment to safety. A 
description of the items considered for each level of analysis, can be found in Table 1.  
  
The level of agreement with each item was assessed by using a 5-point Likert scale that ranged 
from ‘1 = strongly disagree’ to ‘5 = strongly agree’. 
2.3. Analysis of risk acceptance 
Workers’ judgements of risk acceptance were measured together with four other individual 
variables through a questionnaire previously developed and validated by the authors 
(Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão 2014a). A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the variables in 
this analysis: risk acceptance (‘1 = unacceptable’; ‘5 = acceptable’), trust (‘1 = no trust at all’; ‘5 
= high trust’), RP (‘1 = not risky at all’; ‘5 = very risky’), benefit perception (‘1 = not beneficial at 
all’; ‘5 = very beneficial’) and emotions (‘1 = not worried at all’; ‘5 = very worried’). 
Questions about risk acceptance, RP and emotions were based on scenarios, which were 
constructed according to the sector's accident frequency distribution in relation to the number 
of days lost for each accident type. These scenarios took into consideration the most important 
types of injuries according to the results of the safety performance analysis: six scenarios related 
to cuts (acceptance scenario for cuts, ASCi, i = 1, …, 6), five to musculoskeletal disorders 
(acceptance scenario for musculoskeletal disorders, ASMSDsi, i = 1, …, 5) and one related to 
fatality. To analyse the perception of benefit, two groups of questions were included, i.e., 
benefits for the employer and benefits for the employees. Trust was measured at three different 
levels, i.e., trust in management's decisions on risk control, trust in the role of Occupational, 
Safety and Health (OSH) practitioners in risk control and trust in supervisors’ abilities to enforce 
the rules and safety procedures. A more elaborate description of the risk scenarios utilised in 
this study can be found elsewhere (Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão 2014a). 
2.4. Companies’ safety performance 
A safety audit was performed for the analysis of the safety performance. This audit was 
supported by a checklist developed for this study based on the Portuguese legislation (e.g., 
Decree-Law no. 103/2008; Decree-Law no. 24/2012; Decree-Law no. 347/93; Ordinance no. 
987/93) and specific guidelines for the furniture sector (e.g., Miguel et al. 2005). The checklist 
included 112 items related to the safety conditions of workplace, equipment and machinery as 
well as related to tasks (safety behaviours and procedures). The items were selected according 
to the major risk factors in the furniture sector and included items related to each type of 
machine. A 5-point Likert scale adapted from Reese (2012) was used to assess the deficiency 
degree of each item under analysis, in which ‘1 = very deficient’ and ‘5 = excellent’. In all cases, 
‘not applicable’ was a possible response when a risk factor was not verified as relevant to the 
specific situation under analysis. Towards the end of the safety condition analysis, all results 
were discussed with the companies’ managers and supervisors. 
2.5. Procedures 
During the first stage, a safety audit was performed in each company. Subsequently, 
questionnaires were administered to all workers, which were completed during working hours 
or at the end of the work shift. Participants were notified that the questionnaire was voluntary 
and anonymous and that all collected data were to be used by the researchers for scientific 
purposes only. Workers were also informed that if they had experienced any difficulties in 
answering any of the questions, they could request assistance from the researchers or company 
managers. 
2.6. Data analysis 
The safety performance was estimated in percentages for each group while taking into account 
the total number of filled out items on the checklist and their corresponding score (according to 
the 5-point scale). 
Concerning the safety climate, scores were determined by adding up the level of respondents’ 
agreement with each item included in the scale. Bivariate correlation analysis was performed 
using the statistical software package IBM SPSS® version 20 to analyse the correlation between 
safety climate and other variables in the analysis. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Safety performance and safety climate 
The average of safety climate scores for each workgroup and scale as well as the percentage of 
workgroup safety performance was calculated. The results of which are presented in Table 2.  
 
  
For safety performance, in general, higher values were found for companies E, H and N 
and lower values for companies A, G and I. Within companies, the level of safety 
performance was different among workgroups. Specifically, it was lower in groups 
related to the cutting department and higher in groups related to storage and assemblage 
departments. Results in regard to safety climate were similar to those in safety 
performance: groups linked to the cutting department represented the lowest safety 
climate level in the company (e.g., groups 7, 11, 15, 18, 22, 27 and 30) and groups linked 
to the storage and assemblage departments represented the highest safety climate level 
(e.g., groups 8, 10, 12, 16, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 29). Group 20 from company H represents 
the highest safety climate level, whereas group 21 from company I represents the lowest 
level of safety climate. 
Because the results indicated a relationship between the scores on safety climate and the 
percentage of safety performance, the next step was to examine the correlations between 
these variables. The analysis of the relationship between safety climate level and the 
companies’ safety performance was performed at the group level using the aggregated 
mean scores of the safety climate for each group in the analysis. This choice was made 
because safety performance was measured at the group level. Statistically significant 
differences were found across workgroups (total safety climate score (KW(32) = 209.16, 
p < 0.001); organisational level (KW(32) = 237.32, p < 0.001); group level (KW(32) = 
169.83, p < 0.001); and individual level (KW(32) = 154.01, p < 0.001)). The analysis was 
performed separately for each safety climate scale and for the total safety climate score. 
Table 3 shows the correlations and their corresponding levels of significance. A strong 
linear positive relation was found for all the scales in this analysis, which indicates that 
higher safety climate scores correspond with higher safety behaviours and with a 
workplace with better safety conditions.  
 
 
3.2. Influence of safety climate on risk acceptance 
The relationship between safety climate and risk acceptance was analysed in this study. In this 
regard, correlations between each scale of safety climate and each scenario for risk acceptance 
were calculated at the individual level (Table 4). The correlations were insignificant for 
organisational and group scales, with the exception of scenarios ASC2 (r = −0.249, p < 0.001), 
ASC3 (r = −0.118, p < 0.05) and ASMSDs4 (r = 0.126, p < 0.05) on the organisational scale as well 
as of ASC6 (r = 0.099, p < 0.05), ASMSDs4 (r = 0.115, p < 0.001) and ASD (r = −0.120, p < 0.05) on 
the group scale. On the individual scale, however, the correlations were significant and negative, 
with the exception of scenarios ASMSDs2 (r = −0.084, p > 0.05), ASMSDs3 (r = −0.077, p > 0.05) 
and ASMSDs4 (r = −0.020, p > 0.05). 
 
  
A similar analysis was conducted for RP. As shown in Table 5, RP was found to be positively 
correlated with individual safety climate scale for most of the scenarios with the exception of 
three scenarios related with MSDs: RPSMSDs3 (risk perception scenario for musculoskeletal 
disorders; r = 0.072, p > 0.05), RPSMSDs4 (r = 0.042, p > 0.05), RPSMSDs5 (r = 0.009, p > 0.05), 
and with the scenario for death RPSD (r = 0.034, p > 0.05). Six scenarios on the organisational 
safety climate scale were significantly correlated with RPs. However, only scenarios RPSC1 (r = 
0.119, p < 0.05), RPSC2 (r = 0.239, p < 0.001) and RPSC3 (r = 0.103, p < 0.05) were positively 
correlated. These scenarios were also significantly correlated with RP on the group safety 
climate scale, namely with RPSC1 (r = 0.125, p < 0.05), RPSC2 (r = 0.241, p < 0.001) and RPSC3 (r 
= 0.110, p < 0.05). 
 
  
Correlations between safety climate scales and benefit perceptions were also analysed and the 
results are presented in Table 6. Benefits for employers (BE) and benefits for workers (BW), took 
the following three situations into consideration: ‘operating saws without protection’ (1), 
‘performing repetitive tasks for long periods of time’ (2) and ‘performing manual tasks in 
material handling’ (3). The results showed that only BE1 was negatively correlated with safety 
climate on the organisational scale (r = −0.126, p < 0.05) and on the individual scale (r = −0.112, 
p < 0.05). 
 
The relationship between emotions and risk acceptance presented an interesting finding (Table 
7). While the correlation between each emotive scenario and the individual scale of safety 
climate was significant and positive for most of the cut wound scenarios (p < 0.001), with the 
exception of scenario ESC6 (r = 0.079; p > 0.05), no relationship was found between these 
variables for MSDs and death scenarios. This was unexpected because emotions were found to 
be strongly correlated with RP (correlations between r = 0.468 and r = 0.680; p < 0.001). For that 
reason, it was expected that emotive scenarios were going to be more frequently correlated 
with safety climate on the individual scale. 
  
 
 
To better understand these results, an analysis of the differences between two cut wound 
scenarios and two MSDs scenarios with a same frequency and accident severity degree 
was performed. Significant differences were found between the two types of injuries (W 
= −3.795, p < 0.001; W = −1.990, p < 0.05), where higher levels of fear were reported for 
cut wound scenarios. 
Regarding the other scales, negative correlations were found for some scenarios on the 
organisational scale of safety climate, ESMSDs4 (r = −0.167, p < 0.01), ESMSDs5 (r = 
−0.127, p < 0.05) and ESD (r = −0.109, p < 0.05), whereas positive correlations were 
found only for scenarios ESC2 (r = 0.136, p < 0.01) and ESC3 (r = 0.099, p < 0.05). 
Concerning the group scale, only ESC2 (r = 0.110, p < 0.05) was found significantly 
correlated. 
Additionally, the relationship between trust and each scale of safety climate was analysed. 
The results showed that trust in management's decisions (TMang), OSH practitioners’ 
actuation (TOSH) and in supervisor's action (TSuper) were positive and statistically 
significantly correlated with the organisational and group safety climate scales (p < 
0.001). Insignificant correlations were found for the individual safety climate scale (p > 
0.05) (Table 8). 
 
4. Discussion 
This study sought to determine if safety climate is related to safety performance in companies 
and how safety climate influences occupational risk acceptance. To support that analysis, a 
multilevel approach was used to better understand the relationships between these variables 
at the different organisational levels. 
As expected, the study showed that safety climate differs across workgroups and is correlated 
with safety performance levels. This is in accordance with previous studies, which have 
identified safety climate differences due to the influence of the workgroups/companies safety 
performance (Varonen and Mattila 2000; Cooper and Phillips 2004). That correlation was found 
for each scale in the SCWI tool, i.e., the organisational, group and individual scales, which 
highlights the importance of each organisational level in measurements of the workgroup safety 
climate. This reflects the importance that policies and procedures, defined by the companies’ 
management and implemented by supervisors during their interaction with workers, have in the 
improvement of workplace safety (Guldenmund 2007). Workers may see a relationship between 
poor working conditions in their workplace, and their managers’ activity and/or their 
supervisors’ leadership capacities as well as his/her concerns and involvement with safety issues 
(Guldenmund 2007; Martínez-Córcoles et al. 2013). However, it is important to note that the 
norms and safety attitudes of co-workers can also have an influence on workers’ commitment 
to safety (Fugas, Silva, and Meliá 2012; Brondino, Pasini, and Silva 2013). Furthermore, attitudes 
and behaviours of workers towards safety can also be influenced by both rational and perceptual 
processes at the individual level (Guldenmund 2007). 
Differences in safety climate among workgroups have been previously identified (e.g., 
Tharaldsen, Mearns, and Knudsen 2010; Brondino, Pasini, and Silva 2013; Rollenhagen, 
Westerlundb and Näswallc 2013). The differences found among workgroups in relation to safety 
climate levels in this study were interesting because they indicate that workers’ perception of 
managerial efforts and supervisory actions in regards to safety differs across workgroups even 
when some groups had the supervisor. These results can be linked to the different contexts of 
workgroups, e.g., safety performance levels, process demands and work pressure. 
In general, the obtained results indicated that workgroups in the cutting department are the 
most problematic in relation to safety climate and safety performance. In fact, in the majority 
of furniture companies this department is the most critical in regards to workers’ safety. 
According to Miguel et al. (2005) saws, drills and milling–cutting machines, without any 
protection or with their protection compromised by workers, were the most common risk 
factors in this department. This observation was confirmed by this study during the safety audit. 
In addition, situations involving high noise exposure, manual material handling as well as 
materials and cables stored on passageways, were observed in the cutting departments of most 
of the companies in this study. Furthermore, there is high pressure on the cutting department 
in relation to production objectives because other departments are dependent on the cutting 
department's productivity. Thus, workers from this department may be subjected to greater 
pressure from supervisors, this may explain the tendency to value production over safety (Reese 
2012), which may lead workers to ignore some of the safety rules and procedures. This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that there are more risk factors in this sector and that the number of 
rules and procedures is higher, which makes it more difficult for managers and supervisors to 
ensure that workers are in compliance with all the procedures and rules. 
The obtained results also suggest the absence of a relationship between safety climate scores 
and company size. According to a study of the Portuguese Management School of Porto (EGP, 
n.d.), most of the furniture companies in Portugal are small size companies. Furthermore, these 
small companies are expected to have less resources to improve safety, have a reduced 
professionalisation in terms of management, marketing and trade policies, and most of their 
workforce consists of unqualified and undifferentiated workers. Bearing this in mind, this study 
included companies of differing sizes and an effort was made to include several smaller 
companies because they are more representative of this sector. Despite the previous 
assumption that smaller companies may have poorer safety performance, the results of this 
study showed that the smallest companies can have both high and low safety climate scores. 
The overall picture of this study also showed that safety climate is significantly associated with 
risk acceptance and that other variables can influence risk acceptance. However, the influence 
of each hierarchical level is different across each of the variables. 
The individual scale of SCWI was found to have both a direct and indirect influence on risk 
acceptance by influencing RP, benefit perception and emotions. Regarding risk acceptance, all 
scenarios except for the three MSDs scenarios were found to be negatively correlated with the 
individual scale. A significant positive relation of this scale with workers’ judgements about RP 
was also found for the most of the scenarios, except for four scenarios, three MSDs scenarios 
and the death scenario. 
Regarding benefits, the results were also interesting. Only benefits for the employer related to 
‘operating saws without protection’ were found to be negatively correlated with the individual 
scale in SCWI tool. The same occurred with emotions, where only cut wound scenarios were 
found to be positively correlated with this scale. These results suggested that the influence of 
safety climate on risk acceptance can be dependent on the mode of injury, which in this specific 
study was higher for the cut wound scenarios than for MSDs scenarios. In this case, fear related 
to cut wound scenarios played an important role. Workers believed the consequences of cut 
wound scenarios to be more negative because in the furniture companies these are frequently 
related to permanent injuries (amputations). 
Despite the scarcity of studies on the influence of safety climate on risk acceptance levels, 
several studies have already identified the relationship between safety climate and safety 
outcomes, particularly in regards to safety behaviours and compliance with safety rules and 
procedures (see, e.g., Rundmo 2000; Johnson 2007; Lu and Yang 2011; Fugas, Silva, and Meliá 
2012 Tholén, Pousette, and Törner 2013) and to RP (Rundmo 2000; Huang et al. 2007; 
Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo 2008), which indicates also a relationship with risk acceptance. 
In fact, when faced with a risk situation, workers with lower risk acceptance are willing to work 
safely, to comply with company procedures and policies, to display safer behaviours and to 
participate more in the safety management process (Rundmo 2000; Huang et al. 2007). 
Concerning RP, however, the results contrast with those obtained by Tharaldsen, Olsen, and 
Rundmo (2008), where the associations between safety climate scales and RP generally showed 
a significant but negative relationship. Additionally, Huang et al. (2007) found that individuals 
who work for a company with a more positive safety climate perceive a lower risk of injury. 
These divergences were related to differences in the applied methodology because Huang et al. 
(2007) assessed workers’ perception of the risk of getting injured on their job. Tharaldsen, Olsen, 
and Rundmo (2008) also analysed the RP of the occurrence of specific risk scenarios on their 
own platform. These authors found that workers in companies with higher safety climate scores 
perceive less risk of being injured or identify a specific risk situation as less probable to occur in 
their own company. In general, these are workers in companies with a lower frequency of 
injuries. Moreover, these companies have more efficient safety management systems and 
workers comply with safety procedures and rules (Varonen and Mattila 2000; Johnson 2007; 
Arocena, Núñez, and Villanueva 2008; Nielsen et al. 2008; Tharaldsen, Olsen, and Rundmo 2008; 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi 2009; Lu and Yang 2011; Fugas, Silva, and Meliá 2012; Tholén, Pousette, 
and Törner 2013; Hon, Chan, and Yam 2014). In this study, the applied approach was different 
because workers were asked to make a judgement on their level of RP in specific scenarios with 
a specific frequency and severity and not asked to estimate the likelihood of these situations 
occurring in their company. As expected, the results showed that an individual who works in 
workgroups with high safety climate scores judges the presented scenarios as being a higher 
risk. 
The relationship between organisational and group scales of SCWI with regards to risk 
acceptance, RP and emotions was found to be limited. Despite the importance of supervisory 
commitment to and involvement with safety work as well as managerial action in rational 
judgements about risk identified in previous studies (Rundmo 2000), this study found only a few 
scenarios that were correlated with these scales and in some cases the correlation was not the 
expected one. These results suggest that the actions and concerns of managers and supervisors 
regarding safety did not have a direct influence on risk acceptance and that other features of 
workgroups can play a more important role. Co-workers norms can explain these results because 
such norms have been related to safety climate differences among workgroups (Glendon, 
Clarke, and Mckenna 2006; Brondino, Silva, and Pasini 2012; Fugas, Silva, and Meliá 2012). In 
fact, co-workers provide information to other workers and thus can influence safety behaviour 
and perceptions (Brondino, Silva, and Pasini 2012). Consequently, co-workers may have a 
greater importance than supervisors and managers in the risk acceptance level found in this 
study. 
Despite the previous results, organisational and group scales of SCWI were found to be strongly 
correlated with trust and, consequently, have an indirect influence on risk acceptance (Siegrist, 
Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000; Siegrist, Gutscher, and Earle 2005; Bronfman et al. 2008, 2012; 
Bronfman, Vázquez, and Dorantes 2009; Huang et al., 2013; Rodrigues, Arezes, and Leão 2014b). 
Trust seems to be an important factor in the risk management process as it can open 
communication channels and improve the workgroup safety climate (Jeffcott et al. 2006). If trust 
in the managers, supervisors and OSH practitioners’ exists, a higher commitment to safety can 
be expected. Furthermore, workers are motivated to follow the rules and procedures and to 
report any hazard or other nonconformity that they can find to their supervisor or manager. As 
a consequence, higher safety climate levels are expected in such situations (Luria 2010). 
However, it is important to note that this process can work in both directions, as safety climate 
can also have effects on trust (Jeffcott et al. 2006). 
The organisational scale was also found to influence benefit perception of the employer but only 
for one specific scenario: ‘operating saws without protection. This risky behaviour is, actually, a 
common practice in this sector in order to increase production results (Rodrigues, Arezes, and 
Leão in press). However, when the level of safety climate increases, no benefit is observed by 
workers related to this dangerous scenario. Consequently, workers who deem their managers 
to be concerned with safety issues and with the continuous improvement of safety systems and 
that are willing to listen to workers’ concerns as well as their recommendations, express more 
fear of dangerous situations. 
5. Conclusion 
This study was based on the assumption that safety climate may influence safety 
performance and risk acceptance. In using a multilevel approach, the consequences of 
potential safety climate differences between workgroups and how these differences might 
influence these variables were analysed. 
In general, the obtained results identified safety climate as a good measure to predict and 
monitor the safety performance of the workgroups, showing that the higher safety climate 
scores are, the higher safety behaviours and safety conditions in workplaces will be. 
Moreover, the results also showed that SCWI is a good tool to be used in furniture 
companies for the analysis of safety performance as it allows to identify differences 
among workgroups. 
In this study, an important relationship between safety climate and risk acceptance was 
also identified. However, the pattern of the identified relationships was complex. Only 
the individual scale of SCWI that was related to workers commitment to safety is 
correlated with risk acceptance, RP and emotion scenarios. Conversely, issues related to 
managerial and supervisory concerns and actions measured at the organisational and the 
group level were correlated with trust. Perceived benefits were correlated with individual 
and organisational scales. These results allow for a better understanding of the importance 
of each hierarchical level of risk acceptance because they can have both a direct and 
indirect influence. 
Another important issue was the observed differences among workgroups. The results 
suggested that the level of risk acceptance may differ across different work contexts. In 
general, in groups with higher levels of safety climate, the safety conditions are better and 
workers show lower levels of risk acceptance. These differences also occurred with the 
other analysed variables. The trust in supervisors, OSH practitioners and managers is 
higher in groups with higher safety climate scores. In those groups also the RP and the 
reported level of threat are higher and the perception of benefits is lower. Conversely, 
higher risk of acceptance levels is expected from groups with lower safety climate levels. 
This can lead to an increase of unsafe behaviours and to the deterioration of safety 
conditions in workplaces. In this context, the results show that culture (measured by safety 
climate) creates the context for risk acceptance, as has been previously determined by 
Kouabenan (2009). Additionally, in cut wound scenarios more relationships were 
established for emotions and the perception of benefits, which allows one to assume that 
consequences as they are perceived by workers in relation to specific scenarios can 
mediate the relationship between safety climate and risk acceptance. However, additional 
studies are necessary, especially if they focus on other types of injury. It would also be 
interesting to examine these relationships within other industrial sectors. 
The current findings are important for OSH practitioners in the sense that it will allow 
them to understand how workers create their opinion about a given risk and why they 
adopt a certain attitude towards it, as well as why different workgroups react differently 
to the same risky situation. The influence of the safety climate on risk acceptance in all 
the relationships identified among the different variables can help to establish a strategy 
to decrease workers’ tolerance for risk. 
 
Notes 
ASC = acceptance scenario for cuts; ASMDS = acceptance scenario for MSDs; ADS = acceptance 
scenario for death. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001. 
RPSC = risk perception scenario for cuts; RPSMSD = risk perception scenario for MSDs; RPSD = 
risk perception scenario for death. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001. 
BE = benefits for employers; BW = benefits for workers. 
*p < 0.05. 
ESC = emotions scenario for cuts; ESMDS = emotions scenario for MSDs; EDS = emotions scenario 
for death. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001. 
TMang = trust on management’ decisions; TOSH = trust on OSH practitioners’ actuation; TSuper 
= trust on supervisor’ action. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001. 
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